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Abstract This article analyses the impact and legacy of Niccolò Machiavelli’s thought in 
International Relations. It explores the various and contrasting interpretations that have 
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I compare fortune to one of those dangerous rivers that, when 
they become enraged, flood the plains, destroy trees and 
buildings, move earth from one place and deposit it in another. 
Everyone flees before it, everyone gives way to 
its thrust, without being able to halt it in any way. But this 
does not mean that, when the river is not in flood, men are 
unable to take precautions, by means of dykes and dams, so 
that when it rises next time, it will either not overflow its 
banks or, if it does, its force will not be so uncontrollable or 
damaging. 
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, chapter XXV 
 
Assessing the importance of Niccolò Machiavelli’s work in the history of Western 
political thought, Isaiah Berlin (1980, p. 74) noted: ‘Machiavelli’s cardinal 
achievement is […] his uncovering of an insoluble dilemma, the planting of a 
permanent question mark in the path of posterity’. Berlin’s analysis proved to be 
revelatory. Indeed, for scholars of politics and international relations alike, the 
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thought of the Florentine has become a sort of ‘unsolved riddle’. In fact, Machiavelli 
has often been interpreted in a number of different and contrasting ways: sometimes 
referred to as the ultimate interpreter of Staatsräson [raison d’État] (Meinecke, 1924) 
or as a true ‘master of evil’ (Strauss, 1978), as a neo-pagan and demonic thinker 
(Ritter, 1947; Voegelin, 1998) or as a humanist imbued with religious republicanism 
(Viroli, 2010), as an anti-modern thinker of ‘aleatory politics’ (Althusser, 1999) or as 
among the founders of modern politics (Skinner, 1978).  
This ‘ambiguity of Machiavelli’ has long puzzled International Relations (IR) 
scholars. In Martin Wight’s view (1994, p. 16, emphasis added), for example, 
Machiavelli would be ‘the first man (since the Greeks) to look at politics without 
ethical presuppositions. He was in a real sense the inventor of Realism’ (see also 
Wight, 2004, pp. 3–28). According to this reading, Machiavelli would be the one who 
opened the Pandora’s box of modern politics, showing its demonic face: the inability 
to reconcile and harmonize ethics and politics, two worlds toto caelo different, which 
it is necessary to keep distinct and distant. As Berlin (1980, pp. 74–75) has aptly put 
it, ‘the scandal of Machiavelli’ would stem from  
his de facto recognition that ends equally ultimate, equally sacred, may contradict each 
other, that entire systems of value may come into collision without possibility of 
rational arbitration, and that not merely in exceptional circumstances, as a result of 
abnormality or accident or error – the clash of Antigone and Creon or in the story of 
Tristan – but (this was surely new) as part of the normal human situation. 
In this sense, then, the ‘Machiavellian moment’ would represent the ‘zero point’ of 
the realist tradition, the dawn of a new thought on politics finally freed from religion 
and moral values. As a matter of fact, the divide between ethics and politics runs 
throughout the realist corpus and constantly re-emerges in various guises within this 
school of thought. Suffice to think of Thomas Hobbes’s famous dictum ‘Covenants, 
without the Sword, are but Words’,1 or to the sharp separation between private and 
public morality established by G.W.F. Hegel (2003),
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 passing through Max Weber 
(1949, p. 20) and his doctrine of Wertfreiheit and of the ‘absolute heterogeneity’ of 
fact and ‘value-judgments’, up to Carl Schmitt’s analysis (2007) on the ‘autonomy of 
the political’, to mention only some of the best-known names. Kenneth Waltz too 
(2001, pp. 215–216) – before the ‘neo-realist turn’ – describes, in a locus classicus, 
the thought of the Florentine in terms of Realpolitik:  
 4 
To Machiavelli … internal order and external security are necessary before there is 
even the possibility of men living lives of some freedom and decency … If by cruelty 
the dykes and banks are built and kept in good repair, then cruelty is the greatest 
mercy. If by practicing virtue they are torn down again, then virtue is the greatest vice. 
In short, “salus publica suprema lex” would be the assumption behind the whole of 
Machiavelli’s political theory, which would make him the precursor of modern raison 
d’État. Indeed, when politics and the safety of the state are at stake, ‘no 
considerations of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor of glory or of shame, 
should be allowed to prevail’ (Machiavelli, 1882, p. 421).  
This reading has been challenged, as is well known, by R.B.J. Walker. Although 
granting great standing to Machiavelli’s work, Walker (1993, p. 31) is skeptical about 
the inscription of the Florentine secretary’s ideas into a particular ‘tradition’. For he 
maintains that ‘[c]ontrary to both the so-called realists who treat Machiavelli as one of 
their own and the so-called idealists who castigate him for his supposed realism, 
Machiavelli poses questions about political community and practice that may still be 
pursued even though his answers expose his own limited historical and conceptual 
horizons’. In other words, more than being a mere doctrine or set of principles, the 
‘Machiavellian moment’ in IR would reveal the concealed and ‘constituted nature of 
both the theory and practice of international politics’, and hence represent a fruitful 
site of investigation for contemporary IR (ibid., p. 29). 
Walker’s point is an important one. In effect, the various readings and ‘images’ of 
Machiavelli that have taken place throughout history tell us much more of the time 
from which they emerged than on the essence of the Florentine Secretary’s thought. 
Machiavelli, in this sense, can also serve as a ‘theoretical and conceptual mirror’ 
through which to decipher the various ‘political ontologies’ that were reflected in his 
thought, thus giving life to the ‘Machiavelli enigma’ mentioned by Benedetto Croce 
(1949). For example, the characterization of Machiavelli as ‘anti-moral’ and enemy of 
religion, listed in the Index librorum prohibitorum in 1559 and the subject of fierce 
criticism of Innocent Gentillet in his Discours sur les moyens de bien gouverner 
(Anti-Machiavel, 1576),
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 reflects much more the crisis of legitimacy of the Church 
produced by the civil wars of religion in France than the Florentine’s political 
thought; just as the “new prince” coveted by Antonio Gramsci (1992, pp. 125–133), 
in some well-known pages of his Prison Notebooks, tells us much more of his desire 
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to reread Machiavelli in order to give a solid ‘foundation to the national State’ and 
energize the Italian Communist party.  
We are presented with projections and counter-projections, therefore: with smoke and 
mirrors that have served to legitimize – from time to time – different (even opposing) 
political doctrines. Even the shared – and seemingly non-problematic – assumption 
according to which Machiavelli would be the precursor of Realpolitik needs to be at 
least clarified. Max Scheler (1990, pp. 7–74), for instance, by analysing the 
relationship between politics and morality, has identified four conceptions or 
‘solutions’ for what he called the ‘squaring of the circle’ of practical philosophy. 
According to the first conception, in which Scheler (ibid., p. 16) includes the work of 
Hobbes and Marx, ethics would be subject to politics because moral values would be 
nothing more than the product of power struggles (in this sense, politics>ethics). For 
the second type, to which Kant and Bentham belong, it would be for politics to be 
subordinated to ethics because the latter would limit the space for righteous political 
action (ethics>politics). There would then be a third conception, one that we have 
already encountered and can be traced back to Hegel, according to which there are 
two kinds of ethics, a private one and a state or public morality that, due to its 
relevance and importance, must incorporate the former. Finally, there would be the 
Machiavellian conception, according to which between politics and morality there is 
neither unity nor subordination; these two domains are mutually incommensurable 
(politics>|<ethics). 
If, therefore, the ‘realism of Machiavelli’ can be considered a unicum within the 
tradition which he himself had originated, how can we explain this originality? What 
lies behind the incommensurability and incommunicability between politics and 
morality? What conception of history is the background for this ‘autonomy of the 
political’? In Book I of the Discourses, Machiavelli (1888, p. 180, emphasis added) 
addresses precisely this problématique: 
Whoever considers the past and the present will readily observe that all cities and all 
peoples are and ever have been animated by the same desires and the same passions; so 
that it is easy, by diligent study of the past, to foresee what is likely to happen in the 
future in any republic, and to apply those remedies that were used by the ancients, or, 
not finding any that were employed by them, to devise new ones from the similarity of 
the events. But as such considerations are neglected or not understood by most of those 
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who read, or, if understood by these, are unknown by those who govern, it follows that 
the same troubles generally recur in all republics. 
Because of ‘the prodigies of virtue and of wisdom displayed by the kings, captains, 
citizens, and legislators’ of the past, it seems obvious to Machiavelli that history 
should be considered magistra vitae et nuntia vetustatis [directress of life and herald 
of antiquity]. Yet these ‘wonderful examples’ are ‘more admired than imitated’, 
especially in the realm of politics where ‘you will find neither prince, nor republic, 
nor captain, nor citizen, who has recourse to the examples of antiquity’ (ibid., p. 93). 
On the one hand, therefore, Machiavelli embraces a cyclical view of history, 
according to which human affairs are ‘in a state of perpetual movement, always either 
ascending or declining’; on the other hand, this apparent ‘eternal return of the same’, 
which makes the historical course of events readable, finds ‘fault in the present’ 
because ‘we never know the whole truth about the past’ (ibid., pp. 223–224). There is 
therefore an important paradox in the core of Machiavelli’s political theory: the past, 
repeating itself, is like a mine of ‘glorious examples’ that can teach us the correct 
political action, yet, just because we are unable to internalize its lessons, history can 
repeat itself cyclically and slide into future.  
But why then – one might wonder at this point – is historical experience not reflected 
in our political present? How come that the past is a teacher but men are not capable 
of learning? Machiavelli gives two reasons. Firstly, the writing of history always 
misrepresents ‘facts’ because ‘the majority of authors obey the fortune of conquerors’ 
(ibid., p. 223). History is written by the victors who tend – through their perspective 
and writing – to distort it. The second and more important reason lies in human 
nature, and more precisely in the fact that men, in the present, are driven by passions 
and desires, and their ‘hatreds generally spring from fear or envy’ (ibid., p. 223). This 
means that the past is open to logos (writing and discussion) because it is emotionally 
distant, because we do not experience it directly; yet its lesson is soon forgotten 
because in the immediacy of the present men fall prey to their passions. As he put it: 
‘these two powerful reasons of hatred do not exist for us with regard to the past, 
which can no longer inspire either apprehension or envy. But it is very different with 
the affairs of the present, in which we ourselves are either actors or spectators’ (ibid., 
p. 223). Politics is the realm of action and actuality upon which the glory of the past 
shines blinding us, as it were, without lightening our possibilities. In other words, 
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from within the ‘historical cycle’, at its apex as well as at its base, one cannot be 
aware of the momentum and cyclical direction of the constant recurrence. History is 
lux veritatis [light of truth] that cannot be transformed into vita memoriae [life of 
memory]. 
Machiavelli’s world is therefore imbued with a tragic vision of history and politics. 
For the Florentine human passions are immutable as they constantly clash against the 
invisible and fickle walls of Fortune ‘(because their nature is to have all and to do 
everything whilst fortune limits their possessions and capacity of enjoyment)’ (ibid., 
p. 225). And yet, and in this too the ‘realism of Machiavelli’ differs from that of 
Hobbes, the relationship between freedom and destiny, chance and necessity, fortune 
and virtue is not simply based on a negative anthropology (man’s natural propensity 
to evil) which becomes the fulcrum upon which the security problem (survival) rests 
and that, in turn, politics must address by closing itself and creating geometric 
(inside/outside) and well-defined political forms (the Leviathan-state). For 
Machiavelli, political action cannot be caged in a structure because it depends on the 
constantly changing relationship between fortune and virtue. Fortune, as Machiavelli 
explains in a famous passage of The Prince, is a ‘dangerous river’ that can neither be 
stemmed nor sealed in a form or in a space. In fact, ‘the prince who relies completely 
upon Fortune will come to ruin as soon as she changes’ (Machiavelli, 2005, p. 85). 
But human nature is varied too – although immutable in its plurality of ‘faces, 
temperaments and imaginations’4 – and for this reason one must find the right balance 
between circumstances and charisma, turning the chance into necessity, and fortune 
into virtue: 
[…] the man who adapts his method of procedure to the nature of the times will 
prosper, and likewise, … the man who establishes his procedures out of tune with the 
times will come to grief. We can observe in the affairs that lead them to the end they 
seek – that is, towards glory and wealth – that men proceed in different ways: one man 
with caution, another with impetuousness; one with violence, another with astuteness; 
one with patience, another with its opposite. Each may achieve his goals with these 
different means. In the case of two cautious men, we also see that one reaches his goal 
while the other does not. And likewise, two men prosper equally employing two 
different means, one being cautious and the other impetuous. This occurs from nothing 
other than from the quality of the times, that either match or do not match their 
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procedures. (Machiavelli, 2005, p. 85) 
The problem of the incommensurability between politics and ethics is not therefore a 
(merely) political matter but rests on a particular philosophy of history. On closer 
consideration, the ‘realism of Machiavelli’ is an immanentist historicism. Once you 
cut the ties with Providence and theology (and accordingly with teleology), history 
becomes precisely what Max Weber (1949, p. 81), from a perspective far removed 
temporally but theoretically very close to Machiavelli’s, defined as ‘the meaningless 
infinity of the world process…on which human beings confer meaning and 
significance’. The lack of intelligibility of the relationship between past, present and 
future thus becomes a problem for political action and its (often unexpected) 
consequences, a moment open to ‘glorious decisions’ (see Vatter, 2000). True, for 
Machiavelli (2005, p. 86) the nature of man is hardly malleable and very often poorly 
suited to the ‘stern seriousness’ of the times (‘since Fortune varies and men remain 
obstinate in their ways, men prosper when the two are in harmony and fail to prosper 
when they are not in accord’). Yet the great politicians are capable of adapting to their 
time because recognize within themselves, as it were, the signs of destiny. They seize 
the opportunity and with their decisions are able, for a short period of time, to 
navigate the tempestuous seas agitated by contingency and fortuna. In other words, 
history for Machiavelli is configured as a gigantomachia around chance. 
In this sense, then, there is at work in the thought of the Florentine something much 
more shocking than the mere autonomy of politics from ethics and morality: the 
momentous discovery that politics and history are not completely rationalizable, that 
values tend to fall prey to fate and passions, that human nature – unchanging yet 
plural – will always clash against what is constantly mutable; that Fortune, in short, is 
a woman without a face that cannot be fixed into a form to be contemplated. It is this 
complex vision of history and political action, passions and reasons, opportunities and 
decisions that makes Machiavelli a fundamental thinker of (post)modernity. He is the 
founder of a political realism and a theory of modernity alternative to those of Hobbes 
and Rousseau, which are entirely based on social control and social contract (see 
Galli, 2009; Del Lucchese, 2011). Therein lies, in our opinion, the reasons to reread 
Machiavelli in the age of the crisis of the state, of compressed temporality, and of 
unstructured immanence. 
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However, apart for ‘a few, well-known maxims’, and some notable exceptions, the 
‘Machiavellian moment’ in IR has not generated a number of studies truly 
commensurate to the standing of this important thinker. Indeed, while other ‘classics’ 
of international theory – such as Thucydides, Grotius, Hobbes and Kant, to name just 
a few – have been subject of numerous studies, ‘Machiavelli has, by and large, been 
neglected by contemporary students of international relations’ (Cesa, 2014, p. 1). 
Even the engagement by post-positivist scholars after the ‘critical turn’ in IR Theory 
of the early 1990s did not prove long-lasting and ran out of steam soon after it was 
initiated (Walker, 1991, 1993; Gill, 2000; Hoadley, 2001). The literature and research 
networks more recently devoted to reassess the legacy of classical realism from a 
critical theory perspective have furthermore focused on thinkers such as Hans 
Morgenthau (Levine, 2013) and E.H. Carr (Molloy, 2013), curiously marginalising 
Machiavelli so far. No wonder, then, that in a recent important book on the 
Foundations of Modern International Thought, David Armitage (2013, p. 155, fn. 9) 
does not devote a single paragraph to the analysis of Machiavelli’s work and actually 
relegates it to a footnote. 
The aim of this Special Issue is to provide a full exploration of Machiavelli’s complex 
and multifaceted international political theory, resuming an interrupted conversation 
and filling the gap on such a topical thinker. From The Prince to The Discourses, 
from The Art of War to The Histories, the Special Issue aims to re-explore the key 
issues in Machiavelli’s international thought, and dig in depth into some of its most 
fundamental aspects: the relevance of human nature in determining political conflict; 
the influence of his ideas on the Realist tradition; the use of force and the morality 
dilemma; the importance of laws in the foundation of states and their limitations; the 
central role played by charisma and chance in influencing foreign policy; the impact 
of domestic political structures on international politics. As demonstrated by the 
contributors, interrogating Machiavelli’s thought has a significant potential for both 
IR theory and the analysis of specific issues in contemporary international relations. 
Faithful to Machiavelli’s lesson, and to its principle of ‘determinable indeterminacy’ 
of politics, the contributors have tried to re-assess his legacy and ideas aware that – as 
Kenneth Waltz (2001, p. 212) put it – ‘the great political philosophers demand being 
read and read again, and one finds that each rereading brings an enlarged and 
deepened understanding’. 
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Plan of the issue 
The special issue consists of two thematically organised sections. In the first section, 
Machiavelli’s work is presented and assessed in the context of the classical theoretical 
trajectories within IR and compared to the arguably still central theoretical approach 
of political Realism. The first paper of the section by Michael Jackson and Thomas 
Moore evaluates Machiavelli’s ethos of statecraft against the backdrop of Realism in 
International Relations theory. By concentrating, as Machiavelli did, on the walls that 
define political relations, the authors find his insights deeply rooted in the specific 
political contexts of Sixteenth century Italy. In fact, as Jackson and Moore show, 
Machiavelli was mindful of the difficulties of generalizing about walls and 
acknowledged the dangers political actors faced in navigating between the internal 
and external walls of the polity. By examining the geopolitical contours of 
Machiavelli’s walls, Jackson and Moore seek to demonstrate how morality is present 
in these historical spaces. In contrast to Realists, they argue, Machiavelli was ready 
and willing to make ethical judgments. In this sense, they conclude, theorists of 
international politics should exercise care in reaching for Machiavelli as the iconic 
thinker of Realpolitik and for making sense of anarchy in world politics.  
In the second paper, Michele Chiaruzzi follows a different yet convergent theoretical 
trajectory. Analysing a hitherto unpublished manuscript of Martin Wight (for the first 
time edited and published in Italian by Chiaruzzi in 2014), he examines Machiavelli’s 
influence on Wight’s reflection on causal and moral complexity in international 
politics and its relationship with the study and practice of politics. According to 
Chiaruzzi, Machiavelli’s attempt to describe the limits of freedom in political 
experience, and the dilemmas imposed by these limits, has been closely echoed in the 
work of the English School thinker. More specifically, Wight was convinced that 
Machiavelli’s concept of ‘fortune’ describes the most ancient and fundamental 
experience of politics – the politician’s consciousness that men and events are 
recalcitrant to purposeful guidance, that the results of political action never square 
with intention, that he never can have command of all the relevant material. By 
explaining the relevance of these notions to international politics, Chiaruzzi’s paper 
aims at assessing Machiavelli’s legacy in Wight’s thought, presenting a critical 
appraisal of political realism and a rejection of political determinism. In the final 
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paper of this section, Simon Labrecque argues that a productive way of studying 
Machiavelli’s legacy for International Relations is to examine the contemporary 
scholarly works that have sought to assess this legacy. More precisely, he sets out to 
engage the ‘Machiavellian moment’ as a problem that concerns IR through the claims 
made on this issue by R.B.J. Walker. As well known, Machiavelli is given a 
prominent role in Walker’s most famous book, Inside/Outside (1993), as a privileged 
figure through whom the question of a tradition of IR can be re-addressed. In this 
regard, then, reading Walker’s critical examination of the epochal roles attributed to 
Machiavelli in theories of the modern ‘international’ reveals that he repeatedly refers 
to the “overriding importance” of Leo Strauss’s reading of Machiavelli “as the point 
of collapse in the ‘great tradition’ that Strauss counter-poses to modernity”. In 
documenting Walker’s reading of Strauss’s Machiavelli as a political matter of 
concern, and in discussing Strauss’s own account of modernity, Labrecque aims at 
revealing how these two hermeneutical exercises represent an attempt to deconstruct a 
particular ontology of IR.  
But what is Machiavelli’s legacy in our time? Can his work still be used as a map in 
order to frame the ‘liquidity’ that characterizes the so-called global age? In the second 
section of the issue, Machiavelli’s political theory will be used to rethink some of the 
crucial theoretical and political challenges raised by the dynamics of globalization: 
from the fragmentation of the state to the emergence of asymmetric violence, from the 
intensification and transformation of security challenges to the random chaoticity that 
characterizes historical processes in the new global network. Using Machiavelli’s 
conceptualization of power, violence, fortuna and virtù, the contributors will try to 
assess its relevance for contemporary international relations. In this regard, Aslı 
Çalkıvik’s contribution focuses on the conceptualization of political violence in 
Machiavelli’s writings. She explores the extent to which disciplinary appropriation of 
his views on the role of violence in international politics does justice to the 
complexities of Machiavelli’s thought. Despite deep ontological, epistemological 
schisms among various approaches in IR, she suggests, one can discern an implicit 
consensus among scholars concerning Machiavelli’s political language on violence, 
so that they remain wedded to “an instrumental ontology of violence.” Taking as 
starting point this implicit consensus and probing its limits, Çalkıvik contends that 
Machiavelli’s theorization of political violence both complicates and remains in 
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excess of such an ontology: a surplus constituted by the symbolic, affective dimension 
of political violence present in his writings. Through such a reading, Machiavelli 
emerges not only as a political theorist who grasps the violent foundations of modern 
political authority, but also as a thinker, whose perceptive account figures political 
violence as a discursive medium. Following similar lines, Kimberly Hutchings 
investigates the ways in which Machiavelli relates and distinguishes the conditions 
and virtues of war and peace. She argues that the ambivalences, even contradictions, 
within Machiavelli’s writings on the relationship between politics and war speak to 
ongoing concerns about the relation between the state and war. In common with many 
other thinkers at different times and places, gendered language provides one of the 
tools Machiavelli uses to make sense of his ambivalence in the relation he prescribes 
between the republic and the military camp. For Hutchings, analysing Machiavelli’s 
gendering allows for a more complex and nuanced understanding of the relation 
between the state and war, and more broadly, between politics and violence, than is 
available within the gendered terms of contemporary debate.  
Finally, Simon Glezos uses Machiavelli’s radical, a-teleological vision of temporality 
expressed through his discussion of Fortuna to investigate the interrelation between 
XXI century activist movements and the technological revolution. Examining the 
narrative of different ‘Internet Revolutions’ (the Arab Spring, the European Anti-
Austerity/Anti-Neoliberalism protests, the Occupy Movement), Glezos speaks to a 
broader trope in contemporary culture: the cyber-utopian belief in social media as a 
fast track to political change. Machiavelli’s complex and nuanced theory of political 
action – with its attentiveness both to slow-moving community building, and to bold, 
fast-moving action – is ideal for thinking through transnational activism in a 
globalized and accelerating world. Such a framework, according to Glezos, can help 
us think critically about the nature of social media, avoiding the pitfalls of cyber-
utopianism, while embracing the opportunities that information technologies might 
provide us with. Rescuing Machiavelli from his caricature as a ‘thinker of speed’, and 
a defender of statist hierarchies, Glezos reorients our thinking about the Florentine by 
highlighting not just his republicanism, but his attentiveness to the multiple 
temporalities of political life, and the arduous – but crucial – work of community 
building.   
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1The full passage goes as follows: ‘For the Lawes of Nature 
(as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done 
to,) of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are 
contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And 
Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all’. Cf. 
Hobbes (1651, p. 85). 
2
 According to Hegel (2003, p. 275), the state ‘possesses the highest right in relation to 
individuals [die Einzelnen], whose highest duty is to be members of the state’. 
3
 ‘Vous pourrez aussi voir icy, Monseigneur, comme le devoir d’un bon Prince est 
d’embrasser est soustenir la Religion Chrestienne, et de cercher et s’enquerir de la pure verité 
d’icelle, et non pas approuver ni maintenir la fausseté en la Religion comme Machiavel 
enseigne’ [As you can see, your Excellency, the duty of a good Prince is to support the 
Christian religion, and to search for and enquire into its pure truth, and not to approve or 
condone the falsehood in religion as Machiavelli teaches]. Cf. Gentillet (1576, pp. 2–3). 
4
 Cf. Machiavelli’s (1979, p. 63) letter to Giovan Battista Soderini: ‘I believe that as Nature 
has given every man a different face, so she also has given each a different character and 
imagination. From this it follows that each man governs himself according to his particular 
character and imagination. And because, on the other hand, times change and the order of 
things always shifts, the fortunate man, the one whose wishes are completely fulfilled, is he 
who fits his plan of action to the times; to the contrary, the unhappy man is he who fails to 
match his actions to the times and to the order of things’. 
